SUSAN OKI MOLLWAY, Chief Judge.
Findings and Recommendation having been filed and served on all parties on February 20, 2013, and no objections having been filed by any party,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that, pursuant to Title 28, United States Code, Section 636(b)(1)(C) and Local Rule 74.2, the "Findings and Recommendation to Grant in Part and Deny in Part Defendant Homeward Residential, Inc., formerly known as American Home Mortgage Servicing, Inc.'s Motion for Attorneys' Fees and Costs" are adopted as the opinion and order of this Court.
APPROVED AND SO ORDERED.
KEVIN S.C. CHANG, United States Magistrate Judge.
Before the Court is Defendant Homeward Residential, Inc., formerly known as American Home Mortgage Servicing, Inc.'s ("Defendant") Motion for Attorneys' Fees and Costs ("Motion"),
The Court finds this matter suitable for disposition without a hearing pursuant to Rule 7.2(d) of the Local Rules of Practice of the United States District Court for the District of Hawaii ("Local Rules"). After reviewing the Motion, the supporting and opposing memoranda, and the relevant case law, the Court FINDS and RECOMMENDS that the Motion be GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART, and that Defendant be awarded $16,560.39 in attorneys' fees and $14.10 in costs for the reasons set forth below.
As the Court and the parties are familiar with the history of this case, the Court includes only those facts relevant to the instant Motion.
On August 11, 2011, Plaintiff commenced the instant action, pleading the following causes of action: 1) breach of contract; 2) breach of promissory estoppel; 3) violation of the Real Estate Settlement and Procedures Act ("RESPA"), federal statutes, Hawaii Revised Statutes ("HRS") 454 and 454F as amended; 4) intentional or negligent misrepresentation and fraud; and 5) unfair and deceptive practices, HRS Chapter 454f as amended, HRS 480.
On September 6, 2011, SCC filed a Notice of Removal.
Plaintiff timely filed a motion to file first amended complaint, which this Court denied without prejudice. Doc. No. 45. This Court granted Plaintiff another opportunity to file a motion to amend his complaint by May 25, 2012. Id. On May 24, 2012, Plaintiff filed a motion to file second amended complaint. On July 31, 2012, this Court issued an Order Denying Plaintiff's Motion to File Second Amended Complaint ("Order"). Doc. No. 58.
On August 9, 2012, Plaintiff sought reconsideration of the Order. This Court issued an Order Denying Plaintiff Ronald Au's Motion to Reconsider Motion to File Second Amended Complaint and in the Alternative, Motion to File Renewed First Amended Complaint ("Reconsideration Order"). Doc. No. 61. Plaintiff appealed both the Order and the Reconsideration Order on August 23, 2012. On August 24, 2012, 2012 WL 3686893, Chief Judge Mollway affirmed both orders. Doc. No. 64.
On December 11, 2012, Chief Judge Mollway directed that judgment enter in Defendants' favor. Doc. No. 75. The Clerk entered judgment that same day. Doc. No. 76.
The present Motion followed.
Defendant argues that as the prevailing party in this action in the nature of assumpsit and/or one on a promissory note or contract in writing that expressly provides for the recovery of an attorney's fee, it is entitled to $25,453.84 in attorneys' fees pursuant to HRS § 607-14. Plaintiff contends that this action is not in the nature of assumpsit and there is no provision authorizing the award of fees.
A federal court sitting in diversity must apply state law in determining whether the prevailing party is entitled to attorneys' fees. See Farmers Ins. Exch. v. Law Offices of Conrado Joe Sayas, Jr., 250 F.3d 1234, 1236 (9th Cir.2001). Under Hawaii law, "[o]rdinarily, attorneys' fees cannot be awarded as damages or costs unless so provided by statute, stipulation, or agreement." Stanford Carr Dev. Corp. v. Unity House, Inc., 111 Haw. 286, 305, 141 P.3d 459, 478 (2006) (citation and quotation marks omitted); DFS Group, L.P. v. Paiea Props., 110 Haw. 217, 219, 131 P.3d 500, 502 (2006) (quoting TSA Int'l, Ltd. v. Shimizu Corp., 92 Haw. 243, 263, 990 P.2d 713, 733 (1999) ("Generally, under the `American Rule,' each party is responsible for paying his or her own litigation expenses. A notable exception to the 'American Rule,' however, is the rule that attorneys' fees may be awarded to the prevailing party where such an award is provided for by statute, stipulation, or agreement.")).
HRS § 607-14 is a statutory exception to the American Rule. DFS, 110 Hawai'i at 219, 131 P.3d at 502. It mandates the recovery of fees when a promissory note or contract provides for the same, in writing, or when an action is in the nature of assumpsit, and states, in pertinent part:
Haw.Rev.Stat. § 607-14 (emphasis added). Attorneys' fees may therefore be awarded under HRS § 607-14 "in three types of cases: (1) all actions in the nature of assumpsit; (2) all actions on a promissory note; and (3) contracts in writing that provides for an attorney's fee." Eastman v. McGowan, 86 Haw. 21, 31, 946 P.2d 1317, 1327 (1997). A court awarding attorneys' fees pursuant to § 607-14 must apportion the fees claimed between assumpsit and non-assumpsit claims, if practicable. See Blair v. Ing, 96 Haw. 327, 332, 31 P.3d 184, 189 (2001).
Section 607-14 states that reasonable attorneys' fee shall be taxed in favor of the prevailing party and against the losing party. The Hawaii courts have noted that "`[i]n general, a party in whose favor judgment is rendered by the district court is the prevailing party in that court, plaintiff or defendant, as the case may be....'" MFD Partners v. Murphy, 9 Haw.App. 509, 514, 850 P.2d 713, 716 (1992) (quoting 6 J. Moore, W. Taggart & J. Wicker, Moore's Federal Practice ¶ 54.70[4], at 54-323-54-324, (2d ed. 1992)) (some alterations in original); see also Village Park Cmty. Ass'n v. Nishimura, 108 Haw. 487, 503, 122 P.3d 267, 283 (Haw. Ct.App.2005) (citation omitted). Thus, under Hawaii law, in order to be deemed the prevailing party for purposes of § 607-14, Defendant must have obtained final judgment in its favor. The judgment need not result from a ruling on the merits. Ranger Ins. Co. v. Hinshaw, 103 Haw. 26, 31, 79 P.3d 119, 124 (2003) (quoting Wong v. Takeuchi, 88 Haw. 46, 49, 961 P.2d 611, 614 (1998)); see also Blair, 96 Hawai'i at 331, 31 P.3d at 189 ("[A] defendant who succeeds in obtaining a judgment of dismissal is a prevailing party for the purpose of fees under HRS § 607-14."). Insofar as the Court entered final judgment in Defendant's favor, there can be no dispute that Defendant is the prevailing party.
Defendant asserts that it is entitled to attorneys' fees in accordance with the attorneys' fee provision in the Mortgage.
Opp'n, Ex. 1. Insofar as Plaintiff alleged a breach of this Mortgage, see Compl. at ¶ 10, this action constitutes an action on a contract in writing that provides for an attorney's fee. Accordingly, Defendant, as the prevailing party, is entitled to reasonable attorneys' fees.
Even if the Mortgage did not provide for the recovery of fees, Defendant would be entitled to fees because this action is in the nature of assumpsit. "Assumpsit is a common law form of action which allows for the recovery of damages for non-performance of a contract, either express or implied, written or verbal, as well as quasi contractual obligations." 808 Dev., LLC v. Murakami, 111 Haw. 349, 366, 141 P.3d 996, 1013 (2006) (citation, emphases, and quotation marks omitted); Helfand v. Gerson, 105 F.3d 530, 537 (9th Cir.1997) ("Under Hawaii case law, an action in the nature of assumpsit includes `all possible contract claims.'").
However, the mere fact that a claim "relate[s] to a contract between the parties does not render a dispute between the parties an assumpsit action." TSA, 92 Hawai'i at 264, 990 P.2d at 734. "`[T]he nature of a claim' is `determined from the substance of the entire pleading, the nature of the grievance, and the relief sought, rather than from the formal language employed or the form of the pleadings.'" S. Utsunomiya Enters., Inc. v. Moomuku Country Club, 76 Haw. 396, 400, 879 P.2d 501, 505 (1994). It is well-established that "[w]hen there is a doubt as to whether the action is in assumpsit or tort, there is a presumption that the suit is in assumpsit." Jorgensen v. Cassiday, 320 F.3d 906, 919 (9th Cir.2003) (quoting Leslie v. Estate of Tavares, 93 Haw. 1, 6, 994 P.2d 1047, 1052 (2000) (citing Healy-Tibbitts Constr. Co. v. Hawaiian Indep. Refinery, Inc., 673 F.2d 284, 286 (9th Cir. 1982))); see also Helfand, 105 F.3d at 537. "Further, a plaintiff's prayer for attorney fees is a significant indication that the action is in assumpsit." Helfand, 105 F.3d at 537 (citing Healy-Tibbitts, 673 F.2d at 286).
Although the Court looks to the substance of the entire pleading, it must also "determine whether each individual claim alleged in a complaint sounds in assumpsit or tort." Kona Enters. v. Estate of Bernice Pauahi Bishop, 229 F.3d 877, 885 (9th Cir.2000).
The breach of contract and breach of promissory estoppel claims are clearly in the nature of assumpsit. Murakami, 111 Hawai'i at 366, 141 P.3d at 1013; Helfand, 105 F.3d at 537.
The RESPA/HRS Chapter 454 claims are statutory and are therefore not in the nature of assumpsit.
Plaintiff's intentional or negligent misrepresentation and fraud claim is based in tort and therefore not in the nature of assumpsit. Both negligent and intentional
Plaintiff's HRS Chapter 480 unfair and deceptive trade practices cause of action is statutory and is not in the nature of assumpsit. Although § 480-13 provides for the recovery of attorneys' fees, this section applies to plaintiffs, not defendants. Thus, Defendant could not recover fees with respect to this claim alone. TSA, 92 Hawai'i at 264 n. 9, 990 P.2d at 734 n. 9 (the parties do not dispute that the "statutory causes of action (i.e., securities violation under HRS ch. 485, fraud on creditors under HRS ch. 651C, unfair competition under HRS ch. 480, and RICO under 18 U.S.C. § 1962) do not authorize an award of fees to a successful defendant under these circumstances."). In addition, the Hawaii Supreme Court has held that "[p]laintiffs in an action for unfair and deceptive business practices are entitled only to an award of reasonable attorney's fees under HRS § 480-2 and 480-13 and are not entitled, in addition, to attorney's fees in assumpsit under HRS § 607-14." Leibert v. Fin. Factors, Ltd., 71 Haw. 285, 286, 788 P.2d 833, 835 (1990).
Having concluded that two of the five claims in the Complaint are in the nature of assumpsit, the Court must now determine whether it is practicable to apportion the award of attorneys' fees between said claims. Defendant argues that apportionment would be impracticable because all of the claims were premised on the same allegations of contractual mismanagement; that is, all claims were inextricably linked to Plaintiff's breach of contract claim.
When a case involves both assumpsit and nonassumpsit claims, "a court must base its award of fees, if practicable, on an apportionment of the fees claimed between assumpsit and non-assumpsit claims." TSA, 92 Hawai'i at 264, 990 P.2d at 734 (citation omitted). In conducting this analysis, courts must determine whether each individual claim alleged in the complaint sounds in assumpsit or in tort and apportion fees between the assumpsit and non-assumpsit claims if practicable. Kona Enters., 229 F.3d at 885. However, in some cases it may be impracticable or impossible to apportion fees. See, e.g., Blair, 96 Hawai'i at 333, 31 P.3d at 190 ("Because the negligence claim in this case was derived from the alleged implied contract and was inextricably linked to the implied contract claim by virtue of the malpractice suit, we hold that it is impracticable, if not impossible, to apportion the fees between the assumpsit and non-assumpsit claims."). Thus, under Blair, a court may award reasonable attorneys' fees pursuant to HRS § 607-14 to a party who succeeds on a contract claim that is "inextricably linked" to a tort claim, and decline to apportion fees. Id.
In the present case, the Court finds that apportionment would be difficult, if not impossible. Despite the fact that only two of the claims asserted by
Defendant argues that § 607-14's 25% limitation should be based off of the $300,000.00 loan amount. The Court agrees. Because Defendant obtained judgment in this action, the 25% limitation should be based on the amount sued for. Haw.Rev.Stat. § 607-14. Although Plaintiff did not pray for a specific amount in damages, with respect to each Count in the Complaint, he sought special and general damages; offsets and credits; and recoupment. Plaintiff additionally requested treble and punitive damages. Under the circumstances, it would be proper for the Court to base the calculation on the value of the loan amount. Eckerle v. Deutsche Bank Nat'l Trust, Civ. No. 10-00474 SOM-BMK, 2012 WL 896266, at *4 (D.Haw. Feb. 21, 2012) (relying on amount of original mortgage for the purposes of the 25% limitation).
The Court shall now calculate the reasonableness of the fees requested by Defendant. Hawaii courts calculate reasonable attorneys' fees based on a method that is virtually identical to the traditional "lodestar" calculation set forth in Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433, 103 S.Ct. 1933, 76 L.Ed.2d 40 (1983). See DFS, 110 Hawai'i at 222, 131 P.3d at 505. The court must determine a reasonable fee by multiplying the number of hours reasonably expended by a reasonable hourly rate. See id. at 222-23, 131 P.3d at 505-06. In addition, Hawaii courts may consider the following factors:
Chun v. Bd. of Trs. of Employees' Ret. Sys. of Hawai'i, 106 Haw. 416, 435, 106 P.3d 339, 358 (2005) (citations omitted). These factors, however, are merely guides; courts need not consider them in every case. See id. In certain types of cases, some of these factors may justify applying a multiplier to the "lodestar" amount. See Chun v. Bd. of Trs. of Employees' Ret.
Defendant requests $25,453.84 in attorneys' fees, as reflected in the following table:
NAME HOURS RATE TOTAL
Paul Alston 10.3 $567.00 $ 5,840.10
Stephen Tannenbaum 15.8 $225.00 $ 3,555.00
J. Blaine Rogers 14.3 $183.80 $ 2,628.34
J. Blaine Rogers (from 1/2/12) 48 $220.00 $10,560.00
Kelly Guadagno 10.3 $131.30 $ 1,352.39
Kelly Guadagno (from 1/2/12) 2.7 $138.00 $ 372.60
Subtotal $24,308.43
TAX (4.712%) $ 1,145.41
TOTALS 98.7 $25,453.84
Defendant requests the following hourly rates: 1) Paul Alston — $567; 2) Stephen Tannenbaum — $225; 3) J. Blaine Rogers — $183.80 and $220; and 4) Kelly Guadagno — $131.30 and $138. The Hawaii courts consider the reasonable hourly rate in a manner virtually identical to the traditional lodestar formulation and some courts have considered federal law in determining a reasonable hourly rate. See, e.g., Reiche v. Ferrera, No. 24449, 2003 WL 139608, at *8 (Hawai'i.Ct.App. Jan. 16, 2003) ("The reasonable hourly rate is that prevailing in the community for similar work." (citing United States v. Metro. Dist. Comm'n, 847 F.2d 12, 19 (1st Cir.1988)). But see DFS, 110 Hawai'i at 223, 131 P.3d at 506 (determining a reasonable hourly rate by calculating the average of the four requested rates). This Court therefore finds that federal case law on the determination of a reasonable hourly rate is instructive in the instant case.
In determining the reasonableness of an hourly rate, the experience, skill, and reputation of the attorney requesting fees are taken into account. See Webb v. Ada County, 285 F.3d 829, 840 & n. 6 (9th Cir.2002). The reasonable hourly rate should reflect the prevailing market rates in the community. See id.; Gates v. Deukmejian, 987 F.2d 1392, 1405 (9th Cir. 1992), as amended on denial of reh'g, (1993) (noting that the rate awarded should reflect "the rates of attorneys practicing in the forum district"); see also Chun, 106 Hawai'i at 435, 106 P.3d at 358 (listing "the customary charges of the Bar for similar services" as a factor that may be considered). It is the burden of the fee applicant to produce satisfactory evidence, in addition to an affidavit from the fee applicant, demonstrating that the requested hourly rate reflects prevailing community rates for similar services. See Jordan v. Multnomah County, 815 F.2d 1258, 1263 (9th Cir.1987).
This Court is well aware of the prevailing rates in the community for similar services performed by attorneys of comparable experience, skill and reputation. Based on this Court's knowledge of the community's prevailing rates, the hourly rates generally granted by the Court, the Court's familiarity with this case, and defense counsel's submissions, this Court finds that the requested hourly rates are excessive. With respect to Mr. Alston, the Court finds reasonable an hourly rate of $395. Eggs 'N Things Int'l Holdings PTE, Ltd. v. ENT Holdings LLC., Civil No. 11-00626 LEK-KSC, 2012 WL 1231962, at *2 (D.Haw. Mar. 20, 2012), adopted by Eggs 'N Things Int'l Holdings
As for the remaining attorneys and paralegal, the Court finds that the requested rates are slightly excessive in view of the rates typically awarded in this district. The Court consequently reduces the requested hourly rates and concludes that the following hourly rates are reasonable: 1) Mr. Tannenbaum — $200; 2) Mr. Rogers — $165; and 3) Ms. Guadagno — $85.
For the reasoning stated in Section B.1, this Court finds federal case instructive on the reasonableness of the time expended by counsel. Beyond establishing a reasonable hourly rate, a prevailing party seeking attorneys' fees bears the burden of proving that the fees and costs taxed are associated with the relief requested and are reasonably necessary to achieve the results obtained. See Tirona v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 821 F.Supp. 632, 636 (D.Haw.1993) (citations omitted); see also Sharp v. Hui Wahine, 49 Haw. 241, 247, 413 P.2d 242, 246 (1966) (the party requesting fees has the burden to prove that the requested fees were reasonably and necessarily incurred). The court must guard against awarding fees and costs which are excessive, and must determine which fees and costs were self-imposed and avoidable. See Tirona, 821 F.Supp. at 637 (citing INVST Fin. Group v. Chem-Nuclear Sys., 815 F.2d 391, 404 (6th Cir.1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 927, 108 S.Ct. 291, 98 L.Ed.2d 251 (1987)). Courts have the "discretion to `trim fat' from, or otherwise reduce, the number of hours claimed to have been spent on the case." Soler v. G & U, Inc., 801 F.Supp. 1056, 1060 (S.D.N.Y.1992) (citation omitted). Time expended on work deemed "excessive, redundant, or otherwise unnecessary" shall not be compensated. See Gates, 987 F.2d at 1399 (quoting Hensley, 461 U.S. at 433-34, 103 S.Ct. 1933).
After careful review of Defendant's submissions, the Court finds that reductions for clerical work, work completed on a different case, and block billing are necessary and appropriate.
Some of counsel's time entries reflect billing for clerical/ministerial work, and must be reduced accordingly. "[C]lerical or ministerial costs are part of an attorney's overhead and are reflected in
The following is a list of tasks previously deemed clerical or ministerial in this district and therefore deemed non compensable:
Hawaii Motorsports Inv., Inc. v. Clayton Group Servs., Inc., Civ. No. 09-00304 SOM-BMK, 2010 WL 4974867, *5 (D.Haw. Dec. 1, 2010), adopted by Hawaii Motorsports Inv., Inc. v. Clayton Group Servs., NC, Civ. No. 09-00304 SOM-BMK, 2010 WL 5395669 (D.Haw. Dec. 22, 2010); see also, e.g., Yamada v. Weaver, Civil No. 10-00497 JMS-RLP, 2012 WL 6019363, at *10 (D.Haw. Aug. 30, 2012), adopted in pertinent part by Yamada v. Weaver, Civil No. 10-00497 JMS-RLP, 2012 WL 6019121 (D.Haw. Nov. 30, 2012) (deeming clerical work completed on table of authorities).
Here, counsel worked on clerical tasks such as reviewing court notices; communicating with the court; and scheduling dates and deadlines. Counsel expended the following hours on clerical tasks: 1) Mr. Alston — 0.2 hours; 2) Mr. Rogers — 2.2 hours; and 3) Ms. Guadagno — 0.1 hours. Therefore, 2.5 hours should be excluded from Defendant's fee award.
Counsel has included some hours that were incurred in connection with another action initiated by Plaintiff, Au v. Republic State Mortgage Company, Civil No. 11-00251 JMS-KSC. Although the hours may have been legitimately and reasonably incurred in that action, they are not compensable in this action. Mr. Alston expended 5.2 hours, and Mr. Rogers spent 0.4 hours, on tasks related to Civil No. 11-00251.
Finally, the Court must reduce some of the requested hours due to "block billing." "The term 'block billing' refers to the time-keeping method by which each lawyer and legal assistant enters the total daily time spent working on a case, rather than itemizing the time expended on specific tasks." Robinson v. City of Edmond, 160 F.3d 1275, 1284 n. 9 (10th Cir.1998) (citations and quotation marks omitted). Block billing entries generally fail to specify a breakdown of the time spent on each task.
District courts have the authority to reduce hours that are billed in block format because such a billing style makes it difficult for courts to ascertain how much time counsel expended on specified tasks. Welch v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 480 F.3d 942, 948 (9th Cir.2007). See also id. (citing Role Models Am., Inc. v. Brownlee,
Counsel's use of block billing with respect to certain time entries makes it difficult, if not impossible, for the Court to ascertain the reasonableness of the hours expended as to those entries. Hence, the Court imposes an across-the-board reduction of 15% as to the entries that are in the "block billing" format. Signature Homes of Haw., LLC v. Cascade Sur. and Bonding, Inc., No. CV 06-00663 JMS-BMK, 2007 WL 2258725, at *3 (D.Haw. Aug. 3, 2007) (reducing block billed hours by 20%). Mr. Alston billed 0.9 hours in the block format and Mr. Tannenbaum billed 5.8 hours in the block format. As such, the following reductions should be made: 1) Mr. Alston — 0.135 hours and 2) Mr. Tannenbaum — 0.87 hours.
In sum, the Court recommends that counsel's hours be reduced as follows: 1) Mr. Alston — 5.535 hours; 2) Mr. Tannenbaum — 0.87 hours; 3) Mr. Rogers — 2.6 hours; and 4) Ms. Guadagno — 0.1 hours. Applying these reductions, the Court finds that Mr. Alston reasonably expended 4.765 hours; Mr. Tannenbaum reasonably expended 14.93 hours; Mr. Rogers reasonably expended 59.7 hours; and Ms. Guadagno reasonably expended 12.9 hours in connection with this litigation.
The Court is satisfied that Defendant has established the appropriateness of the following attorneys' fees incurred in the present action:
NAME HOURS RATE TOTAL
Paul Alston 4.765 $395.00 $ 1,882.18
Stephen Tannenbaum 14.93 $200.00 $ 2,986.00
J. Blaine Rogers 59.7 $165.00 $ 9,850.50
Kelly Guadagno 12.9 $ 85.00 $ 1,096.50
Subtotal $15,815.18
TAX (4.712%) $ 745.21
TOTALS 92.295 $16,560.39
As earlier discussed, the recommended $16,560.39 award falls well below § 607-14's 25% limitation.
Defendant requests leave to file a supplemental declaration for fees incurred since it filed this Motion. Defendant is granted leave to do so, but the request should be consistent with this Findings and Recommendation and applicable law. The inclusion of hours for work routinely deemed non-compensable in this district may result in a recommendation that the supplemental request be denied in its entirety.
Defendant additionally requests $14.10 in copying costs. Rule 54(d)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that "costs — other than attorney's fees — should be allowed to the prevailing party." Fed.R.Civ.P. 54(d)(1). The Local Rules provide that "[t]he party entitled to costs shall be the prevailing party in whose
Courts have discretion to award costs pursuant to Rule 54(d). See Yasui v. Maui Elec. Co., Ltd., 78 F.Supp.2d 1124, 1126 (D.Haw.1999). The burden is on the losing party to demonstrate why costs should not be awarded. Stanley v. Univ. of S. Cal., 178 F.3d 1069, 1079 (9th Cir. 1999).
In this case, Defendant is the "prevailing party." The Court will therefore tax statutorily permitted costs in its favor. While courts have discretion to award costs pursuant to Rule 54(d), courts may only tax the costs specified in 28 U.S.C. § 1920. See Yasui, 78 F.Supp.2d at 1126 (citing Alflex Corp. v. Underwriters Labs., Inc., 914 F.2d 175, 177 (9th Cir.1990); Crawford Fitting Co. v. J.T. Gibbons, Inc., 482 U.S. 437, 441-42, 107 S.Ct. 2494, 96 L.Ed.2d 385 (1987)). Section 1920 enumerates the following costs:
28 U.S.C. § 1920; Yasui, 78 F.Supp.2d at 1126.
Defendant requests $14.10 in copying costs. Section 1920(4) provides for the taxation of "[f]ees for exemplification and the costs of making copies of any materials where the copies are necessarily obtained for use in the case." Local Rule 54.2(f)(4) provides:
Local Rule 54.2(f)(4). Defendant has submitted documentation to support its request. Mot., Ex. E. Defendant incurred the costs to serve Plaintiff with pleadings and the copies cost $0.10/page, which is less that the per page amount authorized by the Court. As such, the Court recommends that Defendant be awarded $14.10 in copying costs.
In accordance with the foregoing, the Court HEREBY FINDS AND RECOMMENDS that the district court GRANT IN PART AND DENY IN PART Defendant's Motion for Attorneys' Fees and Costs, filed December 21, 2012, and award Defendant $16,560.39 in attorneys' fees and $14.10 in costs.
IT IS SO FOUND AND RECOMMENDED.
